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OPINION
______________
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge
Nicholas Knopick (“Knopick”) appeals the District
Court of the Middle District of Pennsylvania‟s grant of
summary judgment for Appellee Philip Downey (“Downey”),
Esquire, on Knopick‟s legal malpractice tort and contract
claims against Downey. Knopick claims that Downey
committed malpractice in failing to prosecute a legal
malpractice action on Knopick‟s behalf against John
Connelly, Jr., Esquire, Susan M. Kadel, Esquire, and their law
firm James, Smith, Durkin & Connelly, L.L.P. (“Connelly
Defendants”).
Knopick argues that the District Court should not have
applied the occurrence rule to determine the start date of the
statute of limitations for his claim against the Connelly
Defendants; instead, the Court should have tolled the statute
of limitations based on the discovery rule or fraudulent
2

concealment doctrine.
Knopick also argues that even
applying the occurrence rule, the District Court erred in its
ruling because he and Downey had entered into an attorneyclient relationship before the statute of limitations had run.
We find that the District Court erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of Downey based on its
application of the occurrence rule to Knopick‟s underlying
claim against the Connelly Defendants. We will apply the
discovery rule to Knopick‟s underlying claim and we
subsequently find a genuine issue of fact as to when Knopick
should have known of his injury and its cause under the
discovery rule. We will reverse the decision of the District
Court and remand Knopick‟s case for further proceedings, in
accordance with this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND1
On May 11, 1998, Knopick, a commercial pilot, and
his wife, Darlene Knopick (“Dolly”), entered into a
Separation and Property Settlement Agreement (“PSA” or the
“Agreement”) whereby Dolly would receive $60,000 from
Knopick‟s retirement plan. In July 1999, Knopick filed for
divorce. Dolly filed a motion to set aside the Agreement and
to hold an equitable distribution hearing for the property. In
the motion, she alleged that Knopick failed to disclose all of
his stock investments at the time they entered into the
Agreement. Specifically, she was unaware of two million
dollars worth of stock that Knopick held.
Knopick
maintained that at the time of the Agreement, Dolly was fully
aware of all of his assets, including the two million dollars
worth of stock. In any case, the stock was encumbered by a
two million dollar loan.

1

We draw these facts from the record, viewing them in light
most favorable to Knopick. See Vitalo v. Cabot Corp., 399
F.3d 536, 542 (3d Cir. 2005).

3

Knopick retained the Connelly Defendants in 2004 to
represent him in the matter. The Connelly Defendants told
Knopick that the Agreement was valid, and that if it were set
aside, he would only have to pay Dolly the amount that the
stock was worth at the time he entered into the Agreement.
On August 2, 2004, a PSA hearing was held before Judge
Kathy A. Morrow in the Court of Common Pleas in Perry
County, Pennsylvania, to determine whether Dolly was
provided with full disclosure of Knopick‟s assets in 1998.
Before the hearing, Knopick told Connelly of four
witnesses who could testify as to Dolly‟s knowledge of his
assets at the time he entered into the PSA. The witnesses on
the list were Dolly‟s lawyer, Carl Wass; Knopick‟s lawyer,
Michael Hanft; the couple‟s accountant, Charles (“Chuck”)
Pegg; and his wife, Becky Pegg. Knopick claims that
Connelly represented that he would contact the witnesses on
the list, including Wall, Chuck Pegg, and Hanft. Prior to the
PSA hearing, Dolly offered to settle the case, if Knopick
would transfer $300,000 of his UPS stock to her. Based on
advice from Connelly and Kadel, including Kadel‟s
indication that they had a lot of evidence including tax
returns, Knopick rejected the offer.
Neither Kadel nor Connelly met with Knopick prior to
the hearing. On August 2, 2004, the date of the hearing,
Knopick was informed that Kadel, not Connelly—whom he
had expected to appear on his behalf—would represent him at
the hearing. Kadel did not call any of the witnesses that
Knopick had recommended. Kadel told Knopick that
Connelly did not need to be there, that the other witnesses
were not necessary because of the tax records, and that the
Agreement would not be set aside.
In fact, only Knopick testified on his own behalf.
Knopick denied committing any fraud or concealing his
assets. He testified that Dolly was aware of the value of his
stock and that she had access to all of his financial statements.
He further stated that Dolly had access to his financial
information each year when they prepared their joint tax
returns with their accountant, Mr. Pegg.
4

Dolly and her sister, Carol Ann Chaft, testified on
Dolly‟s behalf. Dolly testified that Knopick had acted
fraudulently and had failed to disclose his assets. Dolly
claimed that she thought Knopick only had a small amount of
stocks and that she did not know their value. Dolly asserted
that Knopick and Pegg did not share Knopick‟s financial
information with her when they did the couple‟s taxes. She
also testified that, at the time, she believed Mr. Hanft to be
their family attorney. She professed that she never consulted
with Wass about Knopick‟s assets before signing the
Agreement.
After the hearing, Kadel told Knopick that it had gone
well. Connelly told Knopick later that the hearing “was not a
big deal and that any competent attorney could handle it.”
(App. at 476.) Over the next few months when Knopick
spoke to Connelly and Kadel, they told him that there was
nothing to worry about, and assured him that the hearing had
gone well. On July 7, 2005,2 the Court decided the matter in
Dolly‟s favor, setting aside the Agreement in order to subject
Knopick‟s assets to an equitable distribution hearing.
Knopick claims that at that point, Kadel and Connelly told
him that an appeal was in the works.3 Shortly thereafter,
Knopick discharged the Connelly Defendants because of how
Connelly had handled the custody aspect of the case. At that
point, Knopick hired attorney Rich Wagner to represent him,
and claims that only after Wagner reviewed the case did he
come to believe that Connelly and Kadel may have been
negligent.
2

The state court order refers to the date as July 5, 2005,
however in his brief, Knopick claims that the date of Judge
Morrow‟s Order was July 7, 2005, when it was stamped and
placed on the docket. Downey uses the same date of July 7,
2005 in his brief in response and at oral argument, although
he used the date of July 5, 2005 in his original complaint. For
the purposes of this appeal and because it does not affect our
decision, we will refer to the date of the order as July 7, 2005.
3

Knopick settled the matter in early 2007 by agreeing to pay
Dolly $1,800,000.
5

On July 28, 2006,4 Knopick first met with Mr.
Downey, who had been recommended to him, to discuss
bringing a malpractice action against the Connelly
Defendants for their representation of him in the PSA matter. 5
On August 9, 2006, at Downey‟s direction, Downey and
Knopick met with attorney Albert Momjian, whom Downey
identified as an expert in domestic relations cases. After their
meeting, Downey met with Knopick several times and told
Knopick that he had a good malpractice case. Downey also
told Knopick that he had retained an expert and was filing suit
on Knopick‟s behalf.
On October 26, 2006, Downey sent a letter to the
Connelly Defendants stating, in part, the following:
Having reviewed the hearing
transcript, it does appear that your
firm was negligent in failing to
present both testimonial and
documentary evidence, and for
repeatedly failing to object to
improper testimony by Darlene
Knopick and questioning by her
attorney.
The evidence and objections in
question, were of sufficient
4

Downey claims that this meeting took place on July 30,
2006. Because the two-day discrepancy is of no moment in
our decision, we need not resolve it.
5

On appeal, Knopick claims that even if the occurrence rule
applies, his attorney-client relationship with Downey for the
Connelly Defendants malpractice matter started as early as
the date of this first meeting, on July 28, 2006, before the
expiration of the statute of limitations under the occurrence
rule. Downey claims that by failing to raise it below,
Knopick has waived this argument. Because we will reverse
the District Court‟s ruling on other grounds, we do not reach
this argument.
6

weight that they very likely would
have resulted in a different
outcome. . . . At this juncture we
do not know Mr. Knopick‟s exact
monetary loss as a result of your
firm‟s
apparent
malpractice;
however, it seems almost certain
that it will exceed one million
dollars ($1,000,000), and could
well be in the vicinity of fifteen
million dollars ($15,000,000).
Please place your carrier on notice
of this potential claim. The statute
of limitations on this matter, in
tort, is July 5, 2007, [two years
after the date of Judge Morrow‟s
Order invalidating the Property
Settlement Agreement].
(App. at 523.) On March 30, 2007, five months later,
Downey asked Knopick to sign an official agreement to file
suit on the malpractice claim, which Knopick did. However,
Downey did not file the lawsuit.
On February 25, 2008, Downey sent Knopick a letter
terminating his representation. Knopick claims that until this
time, Downey repeatedly told him that he had a good case.
The letter stated that the two-year statute of limitations on his
claim against the Connelly Defendants had begun to run from
the date of the August 2, 2004 hearing when the firm failed to
call potentially relevant witnesses, and had expired on August
2, 2006, prior to Downey‟s representation of Knopick.6
6

Although it is somewhat unclear from the record and oral
argument what transpired during the time between the signing
of the representation agreement and Downey‟s termination
letter, it is clear from the October 2006 letter that Downey
believed, or at least represented, at one time, that the statute
of limitations did not begin to run until the court‟s July order,
and that he intended at that time, to bring the action in tort.
7

On July 6, 2009, Knopick filed suit against the
Connelly Defendants, claiming legal malpractice under a
breach of contract theory. In that complaint, Knopick also
brought claims against Downey, alleging legal malpractice
under both tort and contract theories of liability. On July 22,
2009, the Connelly Defendants moved to dismiss Knopick‟s
claim against them. On December 29, 2009, the District
Court granted this motion. It found that Knopick‟s claim
against the Connelly Defendants was grounded in tort, not
contract. The tort claim was thus subject to a two-year statute
of limitations which had run, with regard to Knopick‟s claims
against them, regardless of the start date of the statute of
limitations, an issue which the Court explicitly did not decide.
Knopick v. Connelly, Civil No. 09-1287, 2009 WL 5214975,
at *1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 2009). Knopick did not file a timely
appeal of that ruling.
On October 21, 2009, Downey filed a motion for
summary judgment on Knopick‟s claims against him. The
District Court granted the motion on January 25, 2010. In his
motion, Downey argued that Knopick‟s claims must fail
because Downey and the Connelly Defendants did not cause
Knopick to suffer economic damages and because the PSA
was the product of Knopick‟s own fraud. In a footnote,
Downey noted that if Knopick‟s claims survived summary
judgment, a critical factor in determining his tort claim would
be when the applicable statute of limitations began to run—at
the August 2004 hearing or at the time of Knopick‟s notice of
the state court‟s July 2005 order. Knopick addressed the
statute of limitations argument in his brief in response,
claiming that the statute did not commence until the court‟s
order, and that Downey, whom he retained in March 2007,
was therefore retained within the two-year tort statute of
limitations.
Thus, Downey‟s assertion at oral argument before this Court
that he believed the potential claim against the Connelly
Defendants was based in contract and that the statute of
limitations on that claim started at the August 2, 2004 hearing
is not credible.
8

The District Court granted Downey‟s motion for
summary judgment on Knopick‟s tort claim on the statute of
limitations ground,7 finding that the occurrence rule applied
to start the statute on the date of hearing (August 2, 2004).
The Court also found that although the parties made
numerous potentially meritorious arguments, the statute of
limitations on Knopick‟s claims had run by the time he
retained Downey for the malpractice claim. This was
devastating to Knopick‟s claim that Downey committed
malpractice by not filing a claim against the Connelly
Defendants. In so finding, the Court determined that
Pennsylvania‟s discovery rule did not toll the start of the
statute of limitations. The Court also granted summary
judgment on Knopick‟s contract claim for legal malpractice
against Downey, finding that the claim was actually grounded
in tort. 8 The District Court did not reach Downey‟s other
arguments for summary judgment because of its dispositive
statute of limitations determination. Knopick appeals the
District Court‟s order.
7

A tort claim for legal malpractice in Pennsylvania requires
the following:
(1) the employment of the
attorney or other basis for a duty;
(2) the failure of the attorney to
exercise ordinary skill and
knowledge; and (3) that such
failure was the proximate cause of
damage to the plaintiff.
Bailey v. Tucker, 621 A.2d 108, 112 (Pa. 1993). Because the
Court found that the statute of limitations for Knopick‟s claim
against the Connelly Defendants had already run when
Knopick retained Downey, it found that Knopick could not
have met part two of a tort claim because Downey acted as a
reasonable attorney would have under the circumstances in
not bringing an expired claim.
8

Knopick acknowledged at oral argument that he has
abandoned his contract claim.
9

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1332, due to diversity of citizenship of the parties. We have
jurisdiction over this appeal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We exercise plenary review over a district court‟s
grant of summary judgment and apply the same standard of
whether genuine issues as to material fact exist such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). Debiec v. Cabot Corp., 352 F.3d 117, 128
(3d Cir. 2003). We must “view the record and draw
inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.”
In re IKON Office Solutions, Inc., 277 F.3d 658, 666 (3d Cir.
2002).
III. ANALYSIS
State tolling principles “are generally to be used by a
federal court when it is applying a state limitations period;”
therefore, we look to Pennsylvania law, predicting how the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would resolve the statute of
limitations issue. Debiec, 352 F.3d at 128 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); Jewelcor, Inc. v. Karfunkel, 517
F.3d 672, 676 n.4 (3d Cir. 2008). “When ascertaining
Pennsylvania law, the decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court are the authoritative source.” Spence v. ESAB Group,
Inc., 623 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010). When making a
prediction as to how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would
rule, we “must look to decisions of state intermediate
appellate courts, of federal courts interpreting that state‟s law,
and of other state supreme courts that have addressed the
issue,” among other sources. Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Basell USA Inc., 512
F.3d 86, 92 (3d Cir. 2008)).
Pennsylvania imposes a two-year statute of limitations
on tortious conduct, including legal malpractice actions. 42
Pa. C.S.A. § 5524. Pennsylvania favors strict application of
statutes of limitations. Glenbrook Leasing Co. v. Beausang,
839 A.2d 437, 441 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003), appeal granted in
part, 870 A.2d 318 (Pa. 2005) and order aff'd without
10

opinion, 881 A.2d 1266 (Pa. 2005). “Whether the statute has
run on a claim is usually a question of law for the trial judge,
but where the issue involves a factual determination, the
determination is for the jury.” Foulke v. Dugan, 187 F. Supp.
2d 253, 258-59 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (quoting Hayward v. Med.
Ctr. of Beaver Cnty., 608 A.2d 1040 (Pa. 1992)).
The trigger for the accrual of a legal malpractice action
is not the realization of actual loss, but the occurrence of a
breach of duty. Wachovia Bank, M.A. v. Ferretti, 935 A.2d
565, 572 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). Under the occurrence rule,
“the statutory period commences upon the happening of the
alleged breach of duty.” Id. at 572 (quoting Robbins &
Seventko Orthopedic Surgeons, Inc. v. Geisenberger, 674
A.2d 244, 246-47 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)). Where a plaintiff
could not reasonably have discovered his injury or its cause,
however, Pennsylvania courts have applied the discovery rule
to toll the statute of limitations. Wachovia, 935 A.2d at 57274 (citing Pocono Int‟l Raceway v. Pocono Produce, Inc., 468
A.2d 468, 471 (Pa. 1983)). Where the discovery rule does
apply, the two-year period on legal malpractice actions begins
to run where the plaintiff knew or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have known of the injury and its
cause. Crouse v. Cyclops Indus., 745 A.2d 606, 611 (Pa.
2000).
Knopick argues that instead of the occurrence rule, the
Court should have applied the discovery rule in deciding the
statute of limitations issue on his claim against the Connelly
Defendants. Alternatively, Knopick argues that the Connelly
Defendants would have been equitably estopped from
asserting a statute of limitations defense based on the doctrine
of fraudulent concealment.9 Fraudulent concealment would
9

Unlike Downey‟s assertion at oral argument, Pennsylvania
common law does not hold that an exception to application of
the occurrence rule requires fraud or concealment. Though
fraud or concealment may be a factor in determining whether
the discovery rule applies, they are not necessary to its
application. To the extent that Downey alludes to the
separate doctrine of fraudulent concealment, which may also
11

also toll the start of the statute of limitations on Knopick‟s
malpractice claim until he reasonably should have been aware
of his injury and its cause.10 See Fine, 870 A.2d at 861.
The discovery rule is historically “grounded on
considerations of basic fairness.” Taylor v. Tukanowicz, 435
A.2d 181, 183 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (citing Ayers v. Morgan,
154 A.2d 788 (Pa. 1959)). It was first enunciated by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a coal conversion action
where the subsurface injury, defendant‟s removal of coal
from plaintiff‟s property, was unknown to the plaintiff. The
analysis focused on “the inability of the plaintiff, despite the
exercise of diligence, to know of the trespass.” Pocono, 468
A.2d at 471. This tolled the running of the statute, for “no
amount of vigilance w[ould] enable him to detect the
approach of a trespasser who may be working his way
through the coal seams underlying adjoining lands.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lewey v. H.C.
Fricke Coke Co., 31 A. 261, 263-64 (Pa. 1895)) (“He cannot
reasonably be required to act until knowledge that action is
needed is possible to him. We are disposed to hold, therefore,
that the statute runs against an injury committed in or to a

be used to toll the statute of limitations, it requires the
presence of clear or unequivocal evidence of “unintentional
or intentional” fraud or concealment. See Fine v. Checcio,
870 A.2d 850, 860 (Pa. 2005).
10

Plaintiffs often raise these two doctrines as alternative
grounds for tolling.
Indeed, we have described the
Pennsylvania courts‟ development of the doctrine of
fraudulent concealment “[a]s a corollary to the discovery
rule.” Bohus v. Beloff, 950 F.2d 919, 925-26 (3d Cir. 1991)
(finding that the inquiry under the fraudulent concealment
doctrine is the same as that under the discovery rule). As the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated in Fine, “the standard of
reasonable diligence, which is applied to the running of the
statute of limitations when tolled under the discovery rule,
should also apply when tolling takes place under the doctrine
of fraudulent concealment.” 870 A.2d at 861.
12

lower stratum from the time of actual discovery, or the time
when discovery was reasonably possible.”).
Subsequently, the rule was principally applied in
medical malpractice cases, notably one that involved the
failure of a surgeon to remove a sponge after surgery. Ayers,
154 A.2d at 788 (citing Lewey, 31 A. at 261). The discovery
rule was implicated based on the inability of the plaintiff to
ascertain the presence of the sponge. This “prevent[ed] the
commencement of the running of the statute, for „[c]ertainly
he could not open his abdomen like a door and look in;
certainly he would need to have medical advice and
counsel.‟” Pocono, 468 A.2d at 472 (quoting Ayers, 154
A.2d at 792). In Ayers, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
reversed the lower court‟s summary judgment order starting
the statute of limitations at the time of surgery when the
sponge was left in plaintiff‟s abdomen.
Pennsylvania courts have since applied the discovery
rule to other types of actions under the same principle. See
Anthony v. Koppers Co., Inc., 425 A.2d 428, 436 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1980), rev’d on other grounds, 436 A.2d 181 (Pa. 1981).
We also look to our Circuit‟s pronouncements
regarding Pennsylvania‟s discovery rule in the context of
medical malpractice and physical tort claims. We have found
that the rule is “designed to „ameliorate the sometimes-harsh
effects of the statute of limitations,‟ and it is often applied in
medical malpractice and latent disease cases in which the
plaintiff is unable to discover his or her injury until several
years after the tort occurred.” Mest v. Cabot Corp., 449 F.3d
502, 510 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding material issue of fact as to
whether plaintiffs exercised reasonable diligence in
determining cause of their cows‟ illness where plaintiffs
relied on experts‟ advice and defendant‟s representation that
its emissions from industrial facility were harmless) (citing
Cathcart v. Keene Indus. Insulation, 471 A.2d 493, 500 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1984)); see also Bohus, 950 F.2d at 919 (finding
either discovery rule or fraudulent concealment tolled
limitations period and evidence supported jury‟s conclusion
that patient could not have discovered the cause of her
injuries subsequent to bunion surgery until she consulted an
13

orthopedic surgeon where original doctor assured her that the
pain was result of normal healing process and plaintiff
consulted other physicians who confirmed prognosis).11
The common thread in the discovery rule‟s application
in medical malpractice cases is that a plaintiff suffers a
physical ailment after undergoing treatment from a doctor,
but is unaware of the subsequent injury at the time of the
later-alleged breach of duty. Specifically, the symptoms have
not yet become apparent or the symptoms experienced up
until that time are presumed to be normal. Until the plaintiff
experiences abnormal symptoms, or the abnormal condition
11

See also Miller v. Philadelphia Geriatric Ctr., 463 F.3d 266
(3d Cir. 2006) (applying discovery rule in Pennsylvania
survival and wrongful death claim where question remained
whether decedent with mental age of a four-year old knew or
was capable of knowing that he was injured and the cause of
his injury); Vitalo v. Cabot Corp., 399 F.3d 536 (3d Cir.
2005) (noting that where a person is given an incorrect
diagnosis and may be misdirected to injury‟s cause, statute of
limitations might not begin until they are given the correct
diagnosis or should otherwise know the true cause in light of
totality of the circumstances); O‟Brien v. Eli Lilly & Co., 668
F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding under the discovery rule that
if plaintiff had exercised due diligence, she could have
discovered the operative cause of her injury when she read a
magazine article describing a woman with a cancer similar to
her own whose mother took certain hormones during
pregnancy and her doctor told her that the two were possibly
related).
In O‟Brien v. Eli Lilly, consistent with the principle
articulated in other medical malpractice cases, we found that
the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to permit a
jury to find that she could not reasonably have possessed the
salient facts concerning the occurrence of her injury and who
or what caused it since she was able to do so upon inquiring
with her mother and her doctor two years later.

14

manifests itself, a plaintiff shall, under the rule, not be held
responsible for knowing of the injury and/or its cause, thus
triggering the statute of limitations.
These principles are similarly applicable in the context
of legal malpractice actions. Both Pennsylvania courts and
federal courts within this Circuit have recognized the
discovery rule‟s application in legal malpractice matters. In
particular, the discovery rule has been applied in legal
malpractice cases when the injured party is unable, despite
the exercise of due diligence,12 to know of his injury or its
cause. See Bohus, 950 F.2d at 924. These courts have
applied the discovery rule where requiring a plaintiff‟s
knowledge of his injury would otherwise be unreasonable.
The effect is that the discovery rule tolls the running of the
statute of limitations until a plaintiff is put in a position to
discover the injury and its cause, either through inquiry or
retention of a new lawyer. Knowledge may also be imputed
to plaintiffs when an adverse action is taken against them, be
it through a court order or through a third party action, thus
initiating the running of the statute of limitations at that time.
Since this is a matter of state law, we look to
Pennsylvania state courts initially.
The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has acknowledged the occurrence rule in
deciding when the statute of limitations should begin to run in
the criminal defense context of a plaintiff‟s claim of legal
malpractice, but to our knowledge, has not yet analyzed the
discovery rule‟s application to legal malpractice in a civil
suit. See Bailey v. Tucker, 621 A.2d 108, 115 (Pa. 1993)
(“with regard to the respective statutes of limitations, the rule
in this Commonwealth is that the statutory period commences
at the time the harm is suffered or, if appropriate, at the time
the alleged malpractice is discovered”) (citing Pocono, 468
12

The terms “due diligence” and “reasonable diligence” are
used by Pennsylvania courts in describing the requisite level
of investigation necessary to prompt the start of the statute of
limitations under the discovery rule. Because neither term is
material to our finding, we use the terms interchangeably.
15

A.2d at 471).13 However, one of Pennsylvania‟s intermediate
appellate courts, the Pennsylvania Superior Court, has
analyzed the discovery rule in non-criminal legal malpractice
contexts.
These rulings, along with the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court‟s application in the medical malpractice
context, are instructive in this context. Spence, 623 F.3d at
216.
In Wachovia, the Pennsylvania Superior Court found
that under the occurrence rule, plaintiff‟s legal malpractice
and breach of contract causes of action against its attorney
would have accrued at the time the attorney allegedly
breached a duty owed when she failed to mark a judgment in
a legal filing as “satisfied.” 935 A.2d at 574. However,
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the
court assumed that plaintiff, despite the exercise of due
diligence, could not have reasonably been aware of this
alleged breach until a third party initiated proceedings against
the plaintiff for damages. The statute of limitations was
therefore tolled from the time of the failure to mark the
judgment until the third party‟s lawsuit against Wachovia two
13

In Bailey, a consolidated appeal where plaintiffs brought
malpractice actions against their trial attorneys after their
direct appeals and other post-conviction efforts for relief were
resolved, the court determined that the statute of limitations
against a criminal defense attorney would not be tolled until
the resolution of a plaintiff‟s appeal. Id. at 116.
Acknowledging that “the date a defendant becomes
aware that his counsel may have been responsible for the
harm will likely be harder to pinpoint,” the court decided that
“[n]onetheless, it is necessary to establish a point from which
the statute of limitations period will commence,” which it
determined to be the end of the attorney-client relationship,
since the aggrieved defendant would then be “aware of the
injury (i.e., the conviction), and . . . on clear notice to
investigate any alternate cause of that harm which he believes
to exist.” Id. In that regard, the court found “the defendant is
not unlike the medical patient who becomes aware of an
injury and is then placed on notice to discover its cause.” Id.
16

years later, in which the damages regarding the failure to
mark were asserted. Plaintiff‟s delay in filing its malpractice
claim until final resolution of the third party lawsuit nine
years later was not excused by the discovery rule, because the
plaintiff was reasonably aware of the malpractice when the
third party claim was first filed.
In Beausang, 839 A.2d at 437, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court affirmed the trial court‟s application of the
discovery rule in delaying the start of the statute of limitations
in a legal malpractice action. The case involved a leasing
company that retained defendant Butera, Beausang, Cohen &
Brennan (“BBCB”), a law firm, to prepare an agreement of
sale and deed in connection with plaintiff‟s purchase of office
space from a condominium association. The agreement of
sale included language that parking spaces would be included
in the sale, but the deed contained no such language. Six
years after the sale, a dispute arose between the plaintiff and
the condominium association regarding the use of the parking
spaces due to the lack of title transfer of the spaces. The
condominium association sent a letter to defendant BBCB
accusing it of malpractice, a copy of which was sent to the
plaintiff.
At that time, plaintiff Glenbrook sought a second
opinion from another firm which advised that Glenbrook may
have a malpractice claim against BBCB. Following a bench
trial five years later in the action between Glenbrook and the
condominium association, in which the court ruled in the
condominium association‟s favor, Glenbrook filed suit
against BBCB. Glenbrook claimed that the two-year statute
of limitations for malpractice should be tolled until the
resolution of the bench trial.
The superior court held that it would be unreasonable
to expect the individuals that constituted the plaintiff, nonattorneys, to learn of the injury of the firm‟s deficiency in the
deed or the operation of the real estate doctrine of merger at
the time that the sale occurred and the deed was conveyed to
the plaintiff. It made this finding notwithstanding the
reference to the parking spaces in the agreement of sale. The
court found that the plaintiff acquired knowledge of the
17

harm—and the statute of limitations began to run—when the
condominium association sent Glenbrook the copy of the
letter to BBCB accusing BBCB of legal malpractice and
Glenbrook sought a second legal opinion which confirmed
that Glenbrook had a possible legal action against BBCB.14
In Robbins, 674 A.2d 244, plaintiff medical
corporation brought a legal malpractice action against its law
firm, alleging negligence in its filing of an employee pension
plan with the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). The
Pennsylvania Superior Court found that the statute of
limitations did not accrue at the time of filing, but rather
when the IRS, seven years later, notified the corporation that
deductions for the pension plan were disallowed.15
14

See also Fiorentino v. Rapoport, 693 A.2d 208 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1997) (affirming trial judge‟s refusal to grant relief on
statute of limitations grounds because reasonable minds could
differ about when the injury subsequent to the deficient
drafting of stock purchase agreement actually happened, as
between the initial drafting of the agreement, the first time the
parties requested a decrease in monthly installments pursuant
to the agreement, and the complete default in payment;
reversing trial court‟s grant of motion for compulsory nonsuit
because material fact questions existed); Garcia v. Cmty.
Legal Servs. Corp., 524 A.2d 980, 985 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)
(the court found that as a layperson, the plaintiff “was
reasonably unable to learn of her injury until the court
notified her that her suit was dismissed.”).
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See also ASTech Int‟l, LLC v. Husick, 676 F. Supp. 2d 389
(E.D. Pa. 2009) (applying the discovery rule, the court found
that plaintiffs should have known of their injury of lawyer‟s
deficient patent filing and its cause no later than the date on
which plaintiffs revoked defendant prior counsel‟s power of
attorney and retained new counsel who had full access to
information regarding status of both patent applications);
Harsco Corp. v. Kerkam, Stowell, Kondracki & Clarke, P.C.,
961 F. Supp. 104 (M.D. Pa. 1997) (tolling statute of
limitations under the discovery rule until condominium
association notified plaintiff of problem in deed, not time of
18

The nettlesome issue is how to differentiate between
instances when application of the discovery rule is
appropriate or not. Where “reasonable minds would not
differ in finding that a party knew or should have known on
the exercise of reasonable diligence of his injury and its
cause,” Fine, 870 A.2d at 858-59, a court should determine,
as a matter of law, that the discovery rule does not apply.
“„[T]he point of time at which the injured party should
reasonably be aware that he or she has suffered an injury is
generally an issue of fact to be determined by the jury. . . .
Only where the facts are so clear that reasonable minds
cannot differ may the commencement of the limitation period
be determined as a matter of law.” Coregis Ins. Co. v. Baratta
& Fenerty, Ltd., 264 F.3d 302, 307 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting
Sadtler v. Jackson-Cross Co., 587 A.2d 727, 732 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1991)).
Reasonable diligence is an objective test, Kach v.
Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 642 n.17 (3d Cir. 2009), but it is also
“sufficiently flexible to take into account the differences
between persons and their capacity to meet certain situations
and the circumstances confronting them at the time in
question.” Id. at 641 (quoting Miller, 463 F.3d at 276)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]n this context,
reasonable diligence is not an absolute standard, but is what is
expected from a party who has been given reason to inform
himself of the facts upon which his right to recovery is
premised.” Fine, 870 A.2d at 858. Demonstrating the
expected diligence requires a plaintiff to establish a display of
“those qualities of attention, knowledge, intelligence, and
judgment which society requires of its members for the
protection of their own interests and the interests of others.”
Wilson v. El-Daief, 964 A.2d 354, 363 n.6 (Pa. 2009)
(citation omitted). Although there are few facts which
diligence cannot discover, there must be “some reason to
awaken inquiry and direct diligence in the channel in which it
would be successful.” Urland v. Merrell-Dow Pharms., Inc.,
822 F.2d 1268, 1271 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Deemer v.
sale when drafted under occurrence rule).
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Weaver, 187 A. 215, 216 (Pa. 1936)); see also Debiec, 352
F.3d 117.
Where the plaintiff has no reason to investigate, the
statute will be tolled. Foulke, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 258 (citing
Sterling v. Stack & Gallagher, P.C., No. 97-CV-0297, 1998
WL 84006, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 1998)). However, if
something exists to trigger the inquiry, then the plaintiff must
demonstrate that he conducted an investigation, and despite
doing so, did not discover his injury. Id.
Knopick argues that the statute of limitations for his
malpractice action against the Connelly Defendants was
tolled until, at the earliest, July 7, 2005, the date of the state
court‟s order mandating relief to Dolly. He contends that he
did not discover his injury until after this date. He believed
everything had gone well at the hearing based on the
Connelly Defendants‟ assurances, both immediately after the
hearing and over the succeeding months. Knopick did not
believe that his agreement would be set aside. Knopick
argues that this state of affairs affected his ability to discover
his injury and that, until the court‟s ruling,16 he believed that
the Connelly Defendants had handled the hearing
appropriately and that he would win. Hence, he had no
reason to engage in an inquiry or conduct further due
diligence.
16

In his brief, Knopick notes that he did not come to
recognize that the Connelly Defendants had been negligent
until he met with his new attorney. We recognize that under
Pennsylvania law, plaintiffs need not know that a defendant‟s
negligence is the cause for injury before the limitations period
begins to run. All that is necessary is that they know that they
have been injured and the cause of that injury. Harsco, 961 F.
Supp. at 108 (citing Navin v. Byrne, 638 F. Supp. 263, 26465 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (citing DeMartino v. Albert Einstein
Med. Ctr., N. Dist., 460 A.2d 295, 299 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1983))). Here, it would appear that no mechanism or avenue
of inquiry or due diligence existed for Knopick to know
before the July 2005 order that he had been injured.
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Knopick relies primarily on Fine, one of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court‟s most recent iterations of the
discovery rule, which is a consolidated medical malpractice
case that involved a plaintiff‟s inability to discover his injury
through due diligence. In Fine, Defendant Dr. Checcio
surgically extracted Fine‟s wisdom teeth. Fine experienced
symptoms including pain, bleeding, infection, swelling, and
numbness on both sides of his face, but considered these
conditions to be normal, based on advice from Dr. Checcio.
All symptoms except the numbness subsided. According to
Fine, during his office visits with Dr. Checcio in the months
that followed, Dr. Checcio repeatedly told Fine that it would
take six months for the numbness to subside. Some
numbness still continued on the left side of his lip and chin.
When his symptoms continued a year after the surgery, Fine
came to believe that the persistent numbness was abnormal.
Dr. Checcio moved for summary judgment based on
the statute of limitations running from the time of the surgery,
a motion the trial court denied without opinion. The jury
returned a verdict for Mr. Fine. On appeal, Dr. Checcio
argued that the trial court erred in denying her motion for
summary judgment. The Pennsylvania Superior Court agreed
and reversed the judgment for Fine. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reversed the superior court, finding that the
grant of summary judgment was improper. Responding to
Dr. Checcio‟s argument that the discovery rule did not apply
as a matter of law because Fine was aware of the surgery and
knew that his face was numb immediately after, the court
found that, whether Fine should have known through
reasonable diligence that his numbness could have been a
temporary physical consequence of (and thus caused by) the
procedure or a manifestation of his injury remained disputed.
Fine, 870 A.2d at 861. Thus, the supreme court concluded
that issues of fact existed for resolution by the fact finder.17

17

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also found that the
superior court erred in holding that the statute was not tolled
on grounds of fraudulent concealment because the parties
disputed what the doctor actually said to Fine, and found that
21

Knopick argues that, as in Fine, a jury should decide
whether a reasonable and diligent person should have
immediately known that the failure to call witnesses at a
hearing, in this context, was normal. He claims that, as a lay
person, he was unable to know and understand that he had
suffered an injury prior to speaking with other counsel.18
Knopick claims that he relaxed his vigilance, as did the
plaintiff in Fine, who was similarly reassured by his doctor
that his symptoms were normal.19

the jury should decide whether this amounted to fraudulent
concealment.
18

Downey emphasized at oral argument that Knopick, by
virtue of his investments, was a sophisticated financial
investor, and thus should have known of the alleged breach at
the time of the hearing. This argument is without merit. The
notion that a sophisticated investor is knowledgeable in all
legal areas is not persuasive. Knopick has no legal training.
He relied on the Connelly Defendants. There is no evidence
in the record to conclude otherwise.
19

We also find instructive this Court‟s ruling in In re
Mushroom Transportation Co., Inc., 382 F.3d 325 (3d Cir.
2004) analyzing the Pennsylvania discovery rule, albeit in the
context of a bankruptcy case.
In In re Mushroom
Transportation Co., Inc., plaintiff‟s retained legal counsel to
the bankruptcy estate embezzled funds from the estate. The
debtor, who did not have actual knowledge of the
embezzlement while it was taking place, filed several claims
against counsel and his law firm, among others, including
breach of fiduciary duty, wrongful conversion, and
negligence, on which the district court granted summary
judgment for defendants because it found that the claims were
barred by the applicable statutes of limitations and laches
under Pennsylvania law.
On remand to the district court, we pointed to the
Bankruptcy Code‟s encouragement that debtors-in-possession
retain lawyers and noted that “the existence of a fiduciary
relationship is relevant to a discovery rule analysis precisely
22

Downey insists that the statute of limitations began to
run at the time of the PSA hearing on August 2, 2004, not
when the court issued its July 7, 2005 order or sometime
thereafter. He claims that Knopick was fully aware of his
alleged injury at the hearing when the Connelly defendants
did not call the witnesses he suggested to testify. He further
claims in his brief in response, and at oral argument, that
reliance on Pennsylvania medical malpractice cases is
improper, because medical malpractice is treated differently
than legal malpractice, but offers no meaningful support for
that distinction.20
Although we recognize that cases of medical
malpractice require a different kind of trigger for a lay person
to recognize an injury or its cause, and an injury‟s nature and
manifestation will differ, this does not preclude reference to,
or reliance on, the application of the discovery rule, in that
context, in evaluating claims of legal malpractice.

because it entails such a presumptive level of trust in the
fiduciary by the principal that it may take a „smoking gun‟ to
excite searching inquiry on the principal‟s part into its
fiduciary‟s behavior.” Id. at 343 (recognizing that the
existence of a fiduciary, lawyer-client relationship and
fiduciary‟s abuse of that relationship by themselves did not
preclude judgment as a matter of law, but that “the presence
of a fiduciary relationship would be pertinent to the question
of when a plaintiff's duty to investigate arose.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gurfein v. Sovereign Grp.,
826 F. Supp. 890, 919 n.31 (E.D. Pa. 1993)).
20

Downey also claims that Fine is distinguishable because the
statements made by the dentist to the plaintiff about his
symptoms were in dispute, whereas here, the statements made
by the Connelly Defendants are not. Although the court in
Fine did take this issue under consideration in finding that the
lower court prematurely granted summary judgment, the
more salient point here is that it is for a jury to determine
whether Knopick was reasonably diligent in light of the
undisputed statements.
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The District Court below relied in part upon three
district court decisions in deciding when the statute of
limitations began to run at the time of the PSA hearing and
not when Judge Morrow issued her order. However, these
cases did not address attorney assurances; instead they
involved some adverse action or ruling made by the court
against the plaintiff to trigger the plaintiff‟s awareness of
injury and cause, or the alleged breach of duty (or the
plaintiff‟s reaction to it) was obvious enough in nature to
suggest that the plaintiff should have been aware of the
complained-of injury and its cause.
In the first, a district court found that the statute of
limitations for malpractice, based on the attorney‟s failure to
obtain an expert witness, failure to depose witnesses, and
failure to represent plaintiffs‟ interests by demanding an
additional $10,000, began on the day the plaintiffs received
written notice from the attorney that the court had denied
their motion to enlarge discovery to permit opinions of the
expert and that they sought $10,000 to cover anticipated
expenses. Saferstein v. Paul, Mardinly, Durham, James,
Flandreau & Rodgers, P.C., No. Civ. A 96-4488, 1997 WL
102521, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 1997), aff’d without opinion,
127 F.3d 1096 (3d Cir. 1997).
In that case, the court‟s denial of counsel‟s motion for
discovery disallowing the expert, a ruling against the plaintiff,
and defendants‟ request for an additional $10,000 were
apparently construed by the court as being indicative of
potential malpractice at the time. Although that case is not
binding, we cannot find that the alleged conduct of
malpractice in the instant case, as a matter of law, indicated
injury or should have triggered investigation of injury to
Knopick.
The District Court relied on another unpublished
decision, Carlise v. Bartony, Hare and Edson, No. Civ. 04-25,
2006 WL 2226029, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 2006), in which
the court found that an attorney‟s withdrawal of two of
plaintiff‟s claims during trial, and at a minimum the jury
verdict, served as the start of the statute of limitations for
plaintiff‟s claim of legal malpractice for: (1) his attorney‟s
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failure to discover and introduce a deed solidifying his
property rights; (2) withdrawal of the two claims; and (3) the
low amount of damages verdict. Though the court did not
include the entire factual background or discuss alleged
attorney assurances, it concluded that the plaintiff was fully
aware of each of these failures when they happened. The
court discussed the discovery rule in finding that the plaintiff,
at a minimum, was aware of the injuries and their cause as of
the date the verdict was reached, though it did not save the
late filing of his claim, more than five years after the jury
verdict.
Finally, the District Court cited to Pettit v. Smith, 241
B.R. 847 (E.D. Pa. 1999). There, the plaintiff asserted that
the statute of limitations for her legal malpractice claim
should commence when her wages were first garnished by the
IRS based on tax returns she signed two years earlier. She
claimed that her attorneys failed to advise her that these were
joint returns with her husband.
Although the factual
recitation was brief, the court rejected that argument because
it found that the plaintiff‟s deposition testimony and brief
made clear that she knew or should have known when she
signed income the tax returns prepared by her attorneys that
they were being filed on behalf of herself and her husband.
Id. at 851. The court in Pettit also pointed to the plaintiff‟s
conversation with an IRS agent at or around the same time
and payment on the tax bill as evidence that she could have
learned of her potential cause of action. Finally, Pettit does
not discuss attorney assurances. The circumstances in the
instant case do not support a grant of summary judgment
against Knopick, as occurred in these three cases.
Despite the fact that the injury in Fine, as a medical
one, is distinguishable, the supreme court‟s approach there
relies on the same principles for consideration of the
discovery rule and is thereby instructive. The act of
malpractice Knopick now claims is the Connelly Defendants‟
failure to call witnesses at the hearing. The approach in Fine,
suggests we must address Knopick‟s ability, exercising
reasonable diligence, to know of his subsequent injury and its
cause. See Fine, 870 A.2d at 861 (citing Pocono, 468 A.2d at
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471). A close look at the facts is necessary to the
determination of this appeal.
Of critical importance in this case is the distinction
between the act constituting the alleged breach—the Connelly
Defendants‟ failure to call witnesses, which would start the
statute under the occurrence rule—and the injury that flowed
from this failure, constructive knowledge of which would
trigger the statute of limitations under the discovery rule. The
District Court, in applying the occurrence rule, conflated this
distinction to some degree when it stated that plaintiff knew
or should have known of “the alleged malpractice,” what it
described as the Connelly Defendants‟ failure to call
witnesses, as of the date of the hearing. (App. at 11.)
Although it is undisputed that Knopick knew the
witnesses were not called, it remains in dispute, and a
question which we believe a jury should decide, when
Knopick knew that he was injured as a result of the witnesses
not being called. In this case, we believe the District Court
inappropriately equates the breach of duty (or “alleged
malpractice” action) with the injury suffered from that breach.
Given the Pennsylvania courts‟ pronouncements of the
discovery rule, as well as its application by federal courts
within our Circuit, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that
Knopick‟s injury, due to the failure to call witnesses, was
readily ascertainable on the hearing date in light of his
counsel‟s assurances that the witnesses were not necessary
and that the hearing had gone well. As in many of these
cases, Knopick‟s attorney (in the underlying legal dispute)
took an action he now claims was a breach of duty, the
negative impact of which was not necessarily known to him
until a later date.
Beausang, Wachovia, and Robbins suggest that it
would be inequitable to, in all cases, place the onus on a lay
person to know that he has been injured by his counsel‟s
decisions and start the running of the statute of limitations on
his malpractice claim at that time. These Pennsylvania
Superior Court decisions in the first instance, in addition to
Fine and its progeny, support an application of the discovery
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rule. Although the discovery rule has evolved in its
application, its purpose has remained the same. A plaintiff,
unable to know of his injury or its cause because nothing has
yet put him on notice of such injury, should not be held
responsible for investigating until something gives him reason
to do so.21
It is undisputed that Knopick gave the Connelly
Defendants a list of witnesses and discussed with counsel the
topic of their proposed testimony, that Connelly represented
that he would contact the witnesses, and that the issue to be
decided at the hearing was whether Knopick had failed to
make full and fair disclosure of his financial assets at the
initial time of separation. However, we find that reasonable
minds could disagree in determining whether Knopick knew
or should have known, through the exercise of reasonable
diligence, of his alleged injury as early as August 2, 2004, the
date of the hearing. See Fine, 870 A.2d at 863 (citing
Pocono, 468 A.2d at 471); see also Wilson, 964 A.2d at 363.
Reasonable minds could disagree as to whether Knopick had
the necessary clues that set off his obligation to investigate
the implications of the Connelly Defendants‟ failure to call
witnesses prior to the date of the court‟s July 7, 2005 order.
Foulke, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 258.
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We also recognize that in many legal malpractice cases, a
plaintiff will not, like Knopick, bear witness to, or have actual
knowledge of, the act which he later alleges constitutes
malpractice. See, e.g., Robbins, 674 A.2d 244. Here,
although Knopick was present at the hearing when the
witnesses were not called, we do not believe, viewing the
facts in a light most favorable to Knopick, that witnessing this
action, a seemingly strategic one made by his counsel, should
have evoked or inspired knowledge imputed to Knopick, as a
matter of law, that he was injured.
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IV. CONCLUSION
We conclude that the district court erred in finding, as
a matter of law, that the limitations period in Knopick‟s claim
was triggered as of the August 2, 2004 state court hearing.
Applying the discovery rule, we find that a jury could
disagree as to whether Knopick reasonably knew or should
have known of his injury before the court entered its order
against Knopick on July 5, 2005. We therefore find that the
District Court erred in granting summary judgment in
Downey‟s favor based on its application of the occurrence
rule. We will reverse the District Court‟s grant of summary
judgment for Mr. Downey, and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

28

